Policy

As a scientist and engineer, I believe that I have a unique, yet critical role in shaping policy that impacts basic science research, national security, and healthcare. Scientists and engineers have a unique perspective in the policy making process, using their own domain knowledge to determine budget allocations and make legaslative suggestions. In my own work, writing policy memos and discussing policy suggestions with legislature, I have used my domain knowledge in quantum engineering and artificial intelligence to provide expert opinions on budget federal allocations.

I am a 2021 Policy Graduate Associate at Penn's Perry World House . Through this fellowship, I have had the opportunity to share my science policy suggestions with former heads of state, members of the presidential cabinet, leading policy scholars, and journalists. My primary policy focus is in developing infrastructure around the equitable and safe use of emerging quantum technologies, like quantum communications (see piece below). I draft Op-eds, write policy memos, and target federal legislatures including members of the House Committee on Science, Space and Technology. Through my involvement in the Penn Science Policy and Diplomacy Group, I have also targeted the Federal Trade Commission on racially biased AI credit scoring algorithms (link here ).

As we enter the quantum information (QI) age, the implications of quantum technologies on global security will become increasingly prevalent, demanding cohesive international regulations and guidance to prepare all countries for potential quantum cyberattacks and information leaks. Among all QI technologies, quantum computing and quantum communication will have the greatest impact on security. Within quantum communication, protocols based on quantum key distribution (QKD) allow for a sender to transmit a key encoded in a photonic state (e.g. military codes) to a receiver with security guaranteed by quantum mechanics. However, QKD is currently only accessible to Chinese, American, and European banks and defense programs.

As the developed world completely renovates their encryption protocols from classical to QKD-based in the next decade, underdeveloped nations will not be able to communicate with allies relying on QKD protocols and won’t be able to defend against quantum cyberattacks. This presents a major obstacle in national defense for countries lacking significant investments in quantum infrastructure. On the other hand, quantum computing has the potential to break RSA-encryption- the most widely used encryption protocol in which information is encrypted in a public key and then decrypted in a private key. In the next decade, quantum computers will be able to implement Shor’s algorithm , enabling the decryption of arbitrary private RSA keys. The global security impacts of this would be detrimental to ill-prepared governments and organizations, making them vulnerable to classified military information being hacked by adversaries, cyber attacks of power grids, and the inability to effectively respond to attacks. The 15 countries (including the E.U.) with national quantum initiatives have invested nearly 500m USD and the leading quantum technologies companies currently valued around 300m USD will initially have the resources needed to respond to these imminent threats, while putting the rest of the world at risk. This is a global issue requiring an international intervention to maintain equity in preparedness among all nations and there exists no international organizations providing oversight on this issue. I am proposing approaches to translate international interventions in space and AI technologies to quantum technologies, identify the most critical global security threats from quantum technologies, and develop a framework that ensures equity in readiness to quantum cyberattacks.